In the democratizing societies of Europe and Latin America, politi cal officials of many subnational jurisdictions are likely to be elected on platforms of promoting economic development. As they formulate their policies, many such officials will predictably face similar institu tional and substantive constraints: few conventional economic policy instruments under their control; administrators inexperienced in man aging government agencies in a democratic context; few business own ers or managers with an adequate conception of how their industries can create and capture value in highly integrated market-oriented econ omies; innovation or entrepreneurship in business activity unlikely to be a cultural tradition; and government intervention through "plan ning" discredited in the public mind.
The search for effective combinations of policies, agency mandates, organizational strategies, and operational methods in such settings might be significantly aided by examining how the challenge of pro moting economic development was handled in one of Spain's poorest regions-Andalusia-after the nation consolidated its transition to democracy. The goal of improving the economic well-being of this region was codified in the Statute of Autonomy, which became law in 1981. 1 The same commitment was embodied in the electoral program of the party winning an absolute majority in the 1982 regional parlia mentary elections. Once in power, the region's first political executives faced the institutional and substantive constraints listed above.
After a policymaking process described as an act of democratic planning, top regional officials announced a policy of achieving development-from-within.2 Concurrently, the regional parliament created the Institute of Industrial Promotion of Andalusia (IPIA), whose man-date was to promote small and medium-sized locally owned industrial enterprises.3 IPIA's organizational strategy sought to involve the stake holders of a handful of industries in formulating and implementing a common competitive strategy4 and to persuade public and private financial institutions to extend credit and subsidies to participating firms.5 IPIA's operational method was to instigate an interactive plan ning process that focused stakeholders' attention on the need to improve natural resource utilization, product quality, marketing strat egy, infrastructure, plant and equipment, access to financing, procure ment, working conditions, and training. In addition, the planning process intended to identify a large number of actions that would per mit the region's firms to create and capture more value as a result of their work.6 This process entailed negotiating what was termed a com prehensive and dynamic action plan. 7 IPIA's most successful action plan-given the policy of development-from-within and the agency's mission and strategy-involved Andalusia's white marble mining and fabrication industry, which is clustered around the mountain communities of Macael (pronounced Mahk-eye-el) County in Almerfa province. During the first phase of the Macael Action Plan (1983-87), the industry's sales revenues expanded fivefold. The Macael firms' new ability to compete in the growing mar ket for quality finished marble construction materials accounts for the prodigious growth in revenues. Analysis of this case shows that IPIA's operational method-championing the formulation and implementa tion of a negotiated, comprehensive, and dynamic action planenabled Macael firms to compete in the marble construction materials industry.
The skills needed to employ IPIA's operational method success fully-in Andalusia as elsewhere-include leadership, negotiation, and political management. Skilled leaders can mobilize people to face their problems, search for solutions, make informed decisions, and accept change. Skilled negotiators can forge networks of value-creat ing agreements, often involving significant degrees of cooperation among people and institutions. Skilled political managers can influence the policy and operational decisions of people and institutions without the aid of formal authority.
Arguably, officials responsible for agencies such as IPIA can only develop the skills of leadership, negotiation, and political management through practice and coaching. It is conceivable, however, that a prior skillful performance in one setting may leave a residue of clinical knowledge, which, if identified and utilized, would improve the skill displayed by officials subsequently using the same operational method in other settings. In an effort to begin cumulating clinical knowledge relevant for operating in policy contexts bearing a family resemblance to Andalusia in the mid-1980s, this paper offers a series of narrative accounts and interpretations of how the successful Macael Action Plan gradually unfolded.
Initial Conditions
When the Macael Action Plan was initiated in 1983, some 150 fam ily-owned firms employing an average of seven workers were engaged in marble mining and/or fabrication. Business owners followed the production and marketing practices of their forebears, resulting in tech nological backwardness. Dynamite, rather than precision saws, was the principal means by which marble was loosened from hillsides. Few fabricating shops were equipped with mechanical cutting and polishing devices. Even fewer firms were able to establish brand name recogni tion and none had the capacity to fill a major construction order. As a result, 70 percent of extracted marble was sold to manufacturers in other regions in Spain, who produced quality goods for the huge national construction industry, while Macael fabricators limited their production to a narrow line of artisanal goods. This pattern of eco nomic activity had characterized the marble industry in Macael for decades, resulting in static revenues and ingrained resistance to change. Overcoming such impediments would have required some degree of collaboration among firms. However, for Macael's individu alistic business owners, collaboration was anathema.
The Joining-Up Process

Events at Macael
IPIA's first contact with Macael business owners took place in their own quarries and fabricating shops. Accompanied by the local mayor, IPIA's director general spent two days touring these sites before the idea of holding a meeting was broached with business owners. The director used this opportunity to learn about the industry's work and. Macael's deteriorating economy. Through his presence, manner, and line of questioning, IPIA's director also sought to demonstrate his gen uine concern for the industry and to spark curiosity about why IPIA had come to Macael.
By then, it had become common knowledge that a man from IPIA was in town. When the mayor called an impromptu meeting of the employers association and trade unions, their leaders came. The direc tor, Ricardo Sa"nchez de la Morena, explained that IPIA's aim was to build on the strengths of Andalusia's land and people to promote entrepreneurship in the region. He noted that those he had spoken with dur ing the previous two days felt the local marble industry was in crisis and that a solution was not evident. He did not offer a diagnosis, though he mentioned that deficiencies in infrastructure and equipment were clear. He invited the people in attendance to work with IPIA in developing an action plan to "totally modernize" the local industry.
The Macael Action Plan, the director explained, would be unlike most development plans. It would deal with all issues concerning the marble industry, including technology, products, finance, infrastruc ture, and working conditions; it would be dynamic, beginning with a diagnosis of the problems and opportunities of the local marble indus try; and it would focus on changing the reality of the industry. The Macael Action Plan would not be formulated by IPIA, but rather would be negotiated by the assembled group, with IPIA serving as general coordinator. Sa*nchez de la Morena also promised that IPIA would use its influence to mobilize resources from banks, utilities, and govern ment agencies-so long as the group agreed unanimously on every ele ment of the Action Plan.
Knowing that the audience's aspirations for economic betterment were checked by anxieties about participating in such a group process, IPIA's director wanted to build immediate commitment to an action plan. He gave them a stark choice: either agree unanimously at that moment to work with IPIA on a comprehensive, negotiated, and dynamic action plan, or forfeit the chance to enlist his support for mod ernizing the Macael marble industry.8 After some discussion, a vote was taken. It demonstrated that the balance of sentiments had tipped uniformly in favor of initiating the process.
Clinical Interpretations
The initial meeting must include the active participation of the industry's professional associations. No one would be in a better insti tutional position to speak on behalf of business owners than top offi cials of the employers association. The participation of local governmental officials and union leaders may also be essential for sub stantive and political reasons.
How the regional government frames the problem and describes an action plan is of paramount importance. While it is valuable to leave open the question of substance to the industry's own sense of its situa tion and potential, it is equally important to emphasize the defining characteristics of an action plan: that it is negotiated, comprehensive, and dynamic, and that all decisions must be unanimous. These features ensure that each component of the local industry will be a full partner in the action plan and that the interests and concerns of all participants will be addressed during the planning process.
Whether IPIA's brinkmanship during the first meeting at Macael was generally appropriate can be debated. The chief merit of this approach is that it frames as sharply as possible the question of whether to continue sliding into crisis or to work together towards a common solution, drawing to some degree on outside help. Putting the issue to an immediate vote serves other purposes as well. It forces the attendees to make a public commitment to the agency and to each other. If the vote is positive, some of the anxieties about the process will likely be suppressed. Imposing the unanimity rule also serves to embed this important process norm in the group's experience from the start.
Negotiating the Action Plan
Events at Macael
In advance of the first official meeting of the planning committee, which took place in September 1983, IPIA wrote and distributed a draft document that enumerated what it regarded as the key issues and problems of the local marble industry. Hie broad categories of issues were production, commercialization, and personnel. IPIA's director general began the meeting by presenting the draft outline. As the dis cussion developed, it became apparent that opinions differed sharply on factual premises as well as on what should be done. Before closing the session, IPIA urged the committee to adopt a work plan for prepar ing its next meeting. The employers association said it would survey the industry to count the number of firms and workers belonging to each branch of activity and to gauge each firm's level of technological development. In addition, subcommittees on production, commercial ization, and personnel were formed. These groups were charged with the task of drafting preliminary reports about their respective areas of interest, to be presented to the full committee at its October meeting. Each report was to identify problems, proposed solutions, and suggest who would be responsible for followup.
The director came away from the meeting convinced that IPIA needed to be in constant, if informal, contact with the subcommittees during this critical phase in the process. Since travel time between Macael and the Institute's headquarters in Sevilla exceeded eight hours, he could not play this role himself. Sa*nchez de la Morena there fore asked a consultant in whom he had complete confidence to spend the following weeks or months in Macael.
While the work plan did not allow time for formal studies to be done, the subcommittees did have access to advice from knowledge able individuals. As an example, the production subcommittee inter viewed on several occasions the chief of the mining section of the central government's provincial delegation. The expert, Rafael Escribano, shared with the committee the limited information that was known about Macael's white marble deposits and suggested a number of specific studies that he believed would be valuable.
The full committee debated the draft reports during two days of meetings in October. While many disagreements persisted, they were muted by three factors: some disputes about facts were resolved by investigation or expert opinion, committee members had experienced working together, and every participant felt ownership of at least one subcommittee's draft report. By the end of the second day, IPIA's director believed that agreement on the issues was sufficient to support the fonnalization of an action plan. He promised that IPIA would use the subcommittee reports in preparing a full draft of the plan, which would serve as the basis for discussion at the meeting scheduled for November.
Apart from summarizing the problems, the draft identified a number of lines of action, including revising contractual mining rights, com missioning geological and engineering studies of the area's marble deposits, establishing an office for technological support, contracting with designers for assistance in gauging the artisanal goods market, setting standards for product quality, improving roads, expanding elec trical networks, planning industrial sites, creating a purchasing cooper ative, conducting market research, founding a marketing cooperative, improving occupational health and safety, sponsoring educational pro grams, and seeking official financing. Each line of action identified the problem it addressed, conceptualized distinct phases, set a time frame for each phase, and assigned responsibility for implementation to spe cific subcommittees. A slightly modified version of IPIA's proposal was unanimously adopted by the full committee in November 1983 and became the official "Comprehensive Action Plan of the Area of Marble of Macael."
Clinical Interpretations
When the planning process begins, knowledge about the environ ment mostly reflects each committee member's respective experience. Intense conflict is to be expected when people whose perceptions of reality are untested interact for the first time.
Conflict can be productive if it motivates committee members to inquire into questions that they had considered settled. In striving towards this ideal, the action plan coordinator must be willing to play a leadership role in the planning committee. This role entails taking responsibility for structuring the initial discussions, as well as ensuring that diverse viewpoints are heard. Offering a roster of key issues is one way to focus attention. In managing the ensuing discussion, the regional promotion agency should not suppress differences of opinion, but rather should seek to help stakeholders to work through their dis agreements.
Subcommittees can bear much of the burden of detailing definitions of problematic issues, proposing lines of action, and fostering the par ticipants' sense of ownership of the planning process. An action plan coordinator can influence the pace of the subcommittees' work by ask ing them to report by a certain date to the full group. The coordinator also can influence the substance of this work through ongoing informal contacts, which may require establishing a personal presence in the community during this phase of the process.
The realities of the planning process suggest it is incumbent on the coordinator to press for unanimous agreement on the action plan before the industry's problems are systematically studied. It might be thought that this approach is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. However, the coordinator has to be concerned with building a cohesive planning committee, with creating a sense of momentum and accomplishment, with expressing respect for what the industry believed was true, and with projecting a unified image to agencies that would be asked to fund the studies recommended by the committee. Negotiating the first official version of the action plan before the research phase can place an industry in a better position both to obtain resources for high quality studies and to make effective use of what can be learned from expert inquiry. An additional advantage of this seemingly "inverted sequence" is that it embeds deeply into the fabric of the planning group's experience the norm that an action plan is negotiated and dynamic.9
Events at Macael
IPIA's first major task in implementing the Action Plan was to arrange for studies of the area's geological structure and mining prac tices. Preliminary contacts with a state-owned research enterprise, ADARO, indicated that the proposed studies would cost more than 100 million pesetas (roughly, $US 700,000) to complete. Under the national mining promotion law, the Ministry of Industry's General Direction for Mines could fund three-quarters of such costs. Since nei ther IPIA nor Macael could afford to make up the difference, Sa*nchez de la Morena decided to ask the Ministry to fund the full project. He invited Macael's mayor and the president of the employers association to accompany him at a meeting with Ministry of Industry officials in Madrid. In making their case, the trio claimed that Macael was fully committed to finding common solutions to its current crisis, as evi denced by its ability to reach unanimous agreement on its comprehen sive Action Plan. Studies of Macael's geological structure and mining practices were, they argued, crucial to the further development and success of the Action Plan. In the end, the Ministry agreed to fund 100 percent of the ADARO studies.
Thanks to the active role played in formulating the plan by Rafael Escribano, the provincial mining official, participants on the planning committee knew from the outset what information they wanted to obtain through the geological and mining studies. They were looking for an authoritative measure of the magnitude of Macael's marble deposits. They wanted to know how the quality of the area's marble compared with that of other regions in Spain and with that of Carrara, Italy's premier white marble-producing area. They hoped to learn how to reduce the debris generated in huge quantities by the technique of blasting marble blocks and boulders out of quarry frontages. They sought ways to prevent landslides in the mines. In addition, they were curious about how the spatial distribution of the area's various marble formations related to the boundaries of their respective quarries. Some committee members were also interested to know how this information might be used in planning the industry's development.
Since much of ADARO's work took place in the field, many busi ness owners came into direct contact with the activities of the Action Plan. Some business owners gained additional familiarity with the geo logical and mining research studies by attending periodic meetings, called by the employers association, at which interim results were dis cussed. At one event, for instance, Rafael Escribano and ADARO researchers explained the significance of detailed aerial photographs that had been taken of Macael's surroundings. At a subsequent meet ing, it was announced that Macael possessed Spain's largest endow ment of white marble, which ADARO said would likely remain plentiful for at least a few generations, and that Macael's marble was more durable than Carrara's.
With the aid of science, IPIA was able to draw out the competitive implications of these facts about nature: If Macael's white marble was the most plentiful in Spain and more durable than Carrara's, then the area should strive to become a formidable competitor in the national and European marble industry. As to why Macael was suffering an eco nomic crisis, despite its potential competitive advantages, scientific studies provided an alternative answer to a lack of subsidies: the boundaries of the existing quarries did not correspond to rock forma tions and the use of dynamite reduced the yield of valuable marble blocks. This analysis implied that Macael needed to seek solutions to its problems, such as restructuring property rights and introducing major technological change, that were not part of the industry's usual way of looking at itself. These conclusions did ring true for a sizable number of Macael business owners, as indicated by their eventual enthusiasm for both kinds of changes.
Sensing that business owners were emboldened by the news that Macael was richly endowed with marble of the highest quality, yet anxious about the recommendation that mining rights be restructured and technology updated, IPIA created an opportunity for members of the employers association, along with a few other planning committee participants, to travel to Carrara. IPIA and the employers association agreed to share the projected travel expenses of 3 million pesetas ($US 25,000). The trip to Italy by bus was an important experience for those who went along, most of whom had yet to travel beyond Spain. In Car rara, they toured quarries, fabricating shops, and residential areas, find ing little resemblance between the world of Macael and the one they were coming to know. In many quarries, for example, they saw fully automated machines, equipped with industrial diamonds, cut huge blocks out of marble veins. In the fabricating shops, they observed the operation of automatic saws mat sliced marble blocks into thin sheets, which were then mechanically polished into finished floor tiles and steps. During the stay, the visitors from Macael also had a chance to meet with their local counterparts and representatives of Italian equip ment manufacturers. Some members of the delegation came away from this experience saying to themselves, "We are nobodies in this busi ness." The term "total modernization," which had been bandied about by IPIA even since S£nchez de la Morena first proposed the idea of working on an action plan for Macael, suddenly had a fuller meaning.
Clinical Interpretations
An important task at this stage in the process is to draw out the com petitive implications of objective knowledge about the physical and economic environment of the industry. Once business owners become accustomed to thinking that the operating environment can be under stood with some degree of objectivity and that the local industry is a valid unit of analysis, action plan coordinators should help work out a detailed, shared vision that expresses what the industry as a whole wants to achieve. A vision is not so much a statement of objectives as a shared cognitive and affecting image of a state of affairs that individu als sense is worth striving toward. Shared visions motivate individual and collective action and foster agreement on what operational steps should be taken.
When most people reflect upon what they want to achieve, they look for role models. It is reasonable to infer by analogy that a traditional industry's effort to envision an attractive future will be aided if its stakeholders are familiar with traditional industries which overcame the competitive disadvantages of fragmentation. Bringing action plan participants into contact with potential role models could well be the most cost-effective investment a coordinator can make.
Building Institutions and Planning Investments
Events at Macael
During 1984, while the ADARO studies were in progress, members of the planning committee began to explore ways to solve certain prob lems common to all firms in the area. Almost everyone felt, for exam ple, that the dirt roads leading into the quarries were a problem. They were dusty in summer, muddy in winter, and generally unsafe for the large trucks that drove along them hauling away marble stones and boulders. The narrow, winding paved roads that connected the several municipalities of the Macael area to one another and to the major pro vincial roads were also considered inadequate. Knowing that the regional government, which was responsible for roads, was short on funds, the employers association proposed that its members and the government share the costs: if the regional government would pay for the asphalt, the firms would supply the labor to lay it on the roadbed. After some delay, the initiative succeeded. This event set the stage for a more comprehensive agreement in mid-1985 for road improvements, signed by Macael and two departments of the regional government.10 A second major problem upon which all could agree was the need to improve the availability of electricity in the industrial and mining areas. Solving this problem required the cooperation of the privately owned electric power utility of Andalusia, the Compaflfa Sevillana de Electricidad. IPIA took the lead in pressuring the utility to invest in Macael. As a result, the company invested about 74 million pesetas ($US 500,000) in the area in 1984, up from 13 million pesetas the pre vious year. 11
The Macael Action Plan called for studying the feasibility of creat ing several industrywide institutions, which were strongly favored by IPIA and the local government. One of these proposed institutions was a purchasing cooperative, which would take title to inputs it acquired in bulk and stored in its own warehouse until they were repurchased by Macael firms. The proposal did not spark much resistance since interfirm rivalry focused on sales, and business owners recognized that they could purchase supplies at lower prices by concentrating their buying power. Moreover, a similar arrangement among extraction firms for the production and delivery of compressed air-a key blasting input-was already in place. Once the industry agreed in November 1984 to create the purchasing cooperative, plans were made for constructing the warehouse and a former local priest was hired to manage the operation.
The issue that generated the most conflict was the proposed joint sales and marketing cooperative. Both Macael's mayor and IPIA expected this institution to solve such key problems as small firms' inability to fill the large orders of major construction firms, field a sales organization, and fund promotional campaigns. They also hoped that it would mitigate tendencies of local firms to compete with each other for sales principally on the basis of price. Business owners, however, viewed this proposal as a threat to their individual autonomy. The firms whose commercial connections were better developed, furthermore, did not see how they would be advantaged by the marketing coopera tive. Despite stiff resistance from the employers association, both IPIA and the mayor pressed ahead with the feasibility study called for by the Action Plan. The opposition of the employers association relented in mid-1985, when agreement on a relatively weak marketing cooperative was hammered out. 12 In early 1985, IPIA shifted attention to the idea of creating a corpo ration whose principal asset would initially be the brand name, "Mar ble of Macael." This corporation, at a minimum, would prepare audio visual materials on the industry's products, represent the industry at trade fairs, and promote the name of Marble of Macael in the media. A more ambitious conception was to give the corporation the power to prohibit local firms from using the brand name if they failed to meet specific quality standards. This latter suggestion, however, foundered on business owners' unwillingness to have the quality of their products judged by such an organization. IPIA and the mayor believed it was more important to launch the brand name corporation, the "Sociedad de la Marca 'M£rmol de Macael,' S.A.," than to hold out for more restrictive bylaws. The two camps reached an agreement in November 1985. 13 A second major objective of the Action Plan in 1985-in addition to building institutions-was to translate the general vision of Macael's modernization into a plan for investing in plant and equipment. Such a plan was to be used in attracting financing from official and private institutions and in inducing changes in the operations of individual firms. Formulating the industrial restructuring model required detailed knowledge of firms' existing product lines, scale, output quality, access to raw materials, plant, equipment, production management, sales capacity, administrative skill, and the like. This information was col lected by a consulting firm hired by IPIA and the employers associa tion. The interim product of this effort was a classification of Macael firms by product line, based on their existing capacities and what their future role in the industry might be.
This formulation of the industrywide plan for firm-level investments generated some controversy at meetings of business owners convened by the employers association. The consulting firm modified the pro posed model somewhat before recommending investments for each category of firms.
In November 1985, the planning committee made the industrial restructuring model and its investment plan part of the official Macael Action Plan.14 Shortly thereafter, IPIA announced that it would cover 9 percent of the investment costs of the larger firms and 18 percent of those of smaller firms, so long as these firms' proposed projects were consistent with the industrial restructuring model.
By the beginning of 1986, about two years into the implementation of the Action Plan, Macael was thus well positioned to respond to the rising domestic demand for marble construction materials. Some infrastructural improvements were complete and many more were planned, including the development of industrial sites equipped with electrical lines, telephone circuits, and water supplies. Business owners were beginning to collaborate with one another, as long as their autonomy was not genuinely threatened. As a symbol of this new willingness to cooperate, a centrally located building containing the offices of the employers association and the warehouse of the buyers cooperative was about to be inaugurated. The Sociedad de la Marca was gearing up to promote the brand name, Mdrmol de Macael. Many business owners were primed to invest in new plant and equipment; a few had already begun to do so by reinvesting whatever profits they had been earning. The idea of a comprehensive and negotiated action plan for the mod ernization of Macael's marble industry, furthermore, had been given a detailed, logical expression in the industrial restructuring model. But IPIA and the industry knew that even the best laid plans for Macael could founder on the absence of external financial support.
An action plan should eventually offer a clear conception of how the industry as a whole intends to compete in the national and international marketplace. It should also embody specific plans for designing, pro ducing, and selling products. And it should offer a framework for plan ning and evaluating the array of firm-level and collective investments that would make it possible to carry out the strategic business plan.
At the time a shared vision begins to form, such a detailed plan can only be a distant objective. In deciding what issues to take up, in what order, and with what duration of inquiry, an action plan coordinator, therefore, should also seek to achieve some interim process objectives. One such objective is to sustain industry leaders' newly generated opti mism about the prospects for meaningful change and to help their respective constituencies share this attitude.
An action plan committee may create a sense of momentum by ini tially working on issues that tend to generate modest conflict (e.g., road paving and the purchasing cooperative in Macael). When commit ment to the action plan concept is strong and a specific vision is begin ning to form, the planning process can handle intense conflict (such as that generated by the marketing and sales cooperative issue).
In managing intensely conflictual issues, an action plan coordinator might best take a long-term view of its goals. The critical short-term interest includes educating business owners about the prospects of their industry and demonstrating to the outside world that the industry is overcoming the effects of fragmentation. In the short run, it may be less important to enforce common standards of quality, for instance, than to enlarge business owners' experience with collaborative institu tions.
Handling controversial issues sequentially is useful in containing conflict, building decisionmaking capacity, and distributing the plan ning committee's workload over time. Yet, dealing simultaneously with a range of issues, such as infrastructure, plant and equipment, and collaborative institutions is necessary for planning to result in a com petitive strategy before too long.
In advancing simultaneously along these lines without overtaxing the planning committee, it is almost certainly necessary to use the ser vices of consulting firms. Action plan coordinators can reduce the risks of involving consultants by educating them about the premises and precepts of the process. In addition, it is advisable to arrange for at least one of the other planning committee members to share the costs of the consulting work. This arrangement strengthens the norm that the planning committee is responsible for making the decisions that shape the local industry's future. It also facilitates the interactive relationship among experts and decisionmakers essential to a successful action plan.
Mobilizing Resources
Events at Macael
IPIA's early fund-raising efforts on behalf of the Macael Action Plan met with considerable success. As discussed above, the Ministry of Industry agreed to cover the entire cost of ADARO's scientific and engineering studies. The Compaflfa Sevillana de Electricidad and Telef6nica were persuaded to greatly increase their rate of investment in Macael. The regional government, as well, invested $3.5 million during 1984-85 in roads, market research, warehousing facilities for the buyers and marketing cooperatives, office space for the employers association, and a medical clinic for Macael's workers.
Despite these early successes in channeling funds towards research and infrastructure projects, IPIA was extremely anxious about deliver ing on its commitment to help firms finance investments in plant and equipment. The pressures on the Institute to fulfill business owners' expectations became especially acute in late 1985, when the planning committee approved the industrial restructuring model.15 This detailed plan called for investments of more than 3 billion pesetas ($US 25 mil lion) in Macael's fabricating shops (i.e., seven times the amount gener ated by the Action Plan so far).
IPIA's anxiety about delivering on its promise to mobilize resources was further heightened by several facts. IPIA knew that most Macael firms had never obtained subsidies from the central government Andalusia's regional government, moreover, remained short on funds while the fiscal system for Spain's 17 Autonomous Communities evolved. And Macael firms could not yet finance a high proportion of these investments from operating profits.
IPIA also entered into discussions with the Ministry of Industry, which managed the national industrialization fund for Andalusia, to reduce the bureaucratic obstacles that had impeded Macael firms' access to this funding source. In early 1986, the Ministry agreed to pro vide the highest degree of financial support it could, namely, up to 25 percent of those planned outlays for plant and equipment judged by IPIA to be consistent with the restructuring model. It was also agreed that IPIA would serve as a conduit for subsidy proposals.
IPIA also sought to make it easier for Macael firms to borrow funds from private sources. Commercial banks in Andalusia were historically wary of loaning funds to small enterprises. In the years immediately preceding the Action Plan, banks practically refused to extend credit to Macael firms, including Banco Popular, which had maintained a branch office in Macael for 30 years. As the result of negotiations that began in January 1986, this bank agreed to extend five-year loans instead of its usual short-term loans for industrialization projects. The regional government, in turn, agreed to provide an interest rate subsidy of 2 percent for projects that implemented the Action Plan. A similar agreement was reached later in the year with the quasi-public savings bank of Almerfa (Caja de Ahorros). 16 When meeting with banks and agencies, IPIA usually noted that Macael's proven marble reserves were plentiful and that the demand for the area's products would grow markedly. The ADARO studies and the sharp upturn in demand that occurred in 1985-as construction activity revived along Andalusia's Costa del Sol-gave credibility to these points. Citing investments in infrastructure, IPIA also sought to demonstrate the public sector's commitment to eliminating bottle necks. At such meetings, the president of the employers association argued that the area's business owners were committed to making Macael a major force in the national and European marble industry.
In mobilizing resources for Macael, the Institute anticipated that social and political arguments would be as persuasive to some audi ences as economic ones. Andalusia's weak industrialization was widely considered to be a pressing social problem. Many institutions, moreover, were extremely sensitive to the fact that the socialist party had won an absolute majority in the regional parliament after cam-paigning on a platform of social and economic development.17 S&ichez de la Morena explained that IPIA's specific mission was to find ways of manufacturing valuable products from Andalusia's rich endowment of natural resources and to stitch together the region's economic fabric. He pointed out that Almerfa province was otherwise virtually bereft of industrial activity. By implication, financing investments at Macael represented an excellent way to advance the industrial development goals of the regional government and of the Andalusian public.
The Macael planning committee promoted this concept through a variety of means. For example, the employers association in 1985 invented the Premio de Mdrmol, a prize to be awarded annually to an individual or institution who made a significant contribution to the local industry. The association's leadership chose the award recipients carefully. In 1987, for instance, a Premio de Mdrmol was given to the editor of a national news magazine, Cambio 16, who had previously worked for a prominent newspaper in Almerfa; to the director of a major provincial bank, Caja Almerfa; and to the trade association of eastern Andalusia's architects. In this way, special ties were fostered with national media, banking, and customer organizations. Members of the planning committee found additional ways to draw influential out siders to Macael. As just one example, the regional government's pres ident came to inaugurate the warehouses for the buyers and marketing cooperatives in March 1986. Apart from these special events, planning committee leaders created hundreds of opportunities to project Macael's image as an industry and community on the move.18
The combined efforts of IPIA and the Macael Action Plan leaders succeeded in generating about 700 million pesetas ($US 5 million) in government grants and about 1,850 million pesetas ($US 15 million) in loans for investments in plant and equipment during 1986-88. The goals for aggregate investment in plant and equipment, set out in the industrial restructuring model, were practically reached before the end of 1988, thanks in large part to an extremely high rate of profit rein vestment. The total investment in Macael, including infrastructure, research, and institution-building, exceeded 5 billion pesetas ($US 42 million) during the first five years of the Action Plan.
Once the coordinator votes in favor of an action plan proposal requiring external financial resources, it is obligated to use its institu tional muscle with banks, government agencies, and utilities in order to implement the agreed upon plan. In many cases, banks and govern ment agencies are reluctant to invest in industries of the past When decisionmakers are naturally skeptical of investing resources in tradi tional industries, it is advantageous to expose them to the action plan process. One way to do so is for the coordinator to be joined by other key planning committee members at negotiating sessions; another is to invite decisionmakers to make site visits. The action plan's numerous diagnostic and prescriptive studies are another important tool for explaining how implementing the plan will enable the local industry to compete.
If agencies are seeking to make their programs visible in the public eye, it makes sense to intimate that a formal agreement will be publi cized and that credit for the overall success of the action plan will be shared. If funding agencies and banks are looking for ways to serve small and medium-sized firms efficiently, it is advantageous to explain how the framework of the action plan will reduce the transaction costs of evaluating individual project proposals. To underscore this advan tage, action plan coordinators might serve as a conduit between partic ular firms and these large institutions.
Outcomes
While total quarry output increased 33 percent between 1983 and 1987, the production of marble suited for construction materials rose by 75 percent. 19 As a result of improvements in mining and fabrication, some 20 firms became major suppliers of building materials. By 1987, only 30 percent of sales were accounted for by unprocessed marble, while annual revenues reached 15 billion pesetas ($US 125 million).20
The industrial restructuring study recommended that firms that could not produce raw materials economically focus on the fabrication of decorative objects. The extent to which firms have followed this recommendation cannot be estimated with available data. It is, however, clear that some shops have purchased equipment to mecha nize this production process.
The number of firms that complied with the Action Plan and received subsidies from the regional government increased from 16 to 64 between 1985, when the industrial restructuring study was com pleted, and 1987.21 Total investment in plant and equipment during 1984-88 reached $US 30.6 million.22
The Sociedad de la Marca has been extremely active in promoting the brand name "Mdrmol de Macael" Between 1986 and 1987, it administered an advertising promotion budget of more than 70 million pesetas (about $US 600,000). Its activities, along with the objective improvements in product quality, have made the name "Macael" a potent signal of value in the national marble industry.
Macael firms have utilized their purchasing cooperative. It is diffi cult to estimate, however, the magnitude of the cost savings it gener ated. The sales and marketing cooperative has not been utilized by firms catering to the construction industry. Most firms have been sell ing directly all they can produce, thanks to a boom in luxury construc tion activity in Spain.
Conclusion
The use of the operational method of coordinating a negotiated, comprehensive, and dynamic Action Plan helped to achieve results in Macael that were congruent with the political platform of Andalusia's elected leaders and public policies, as well as with IPIA's mandate and organizational strategy during the 1982-87 period. These results were achieved despite such constraints as distrust of governmental eco nomic or regional planning, a weak enterprising tradition, and the regional government's minimal direct control over economic policy instruments. The Macael case shows that this combination of policies, mandates, organizational strategies, and operational methods can be remarkably effective in contexts such as Andalusia, where subnational governmental officials were committed to promoting economic devel opment in the aftermath of a transition to democracy.
An action plan is an operational method whose effectiveness in pro moting the aims of public policy depends significantly on the skill with which it is managed. While some skilled performances may be based solely on personal and inarticulate knowledge,23 coordinating an action plan is not one of them. Practitioners' skill in using this method may be enhanced by expanding their clinical knowledge.2* This paper expands clinical knowledge about the use of this operational method by inter preting why specific actions in Macael helped achieve the public pol icy aim of developing locally based industries in Andalusia. 25 To be skilled practitioners, coordinators of action plans also need a way to conceptualize or frame the role they play. Role frames "deter mine practitioners' strategies of attention and thereby set the directions in which they try to shape the problematic situations they confront."26 Judging from the Macael case, an appropriate role frame for action plan coordinators may be grounded in conceptual networks such as service management, issue framing, leadership, social learning, negoti ation, and political management. 27 The literature about these concep tual networks-which structure an emerging American conception of public management-is a useful source of precepts for developing the role frame of action plan coordinators, as indicated below. 1. Service Management. Treat the stakeholders in an industry as cus tomers. Imagine how customers are likely to experience initial contacts with agency personnel. Assure stakeholders that the agency wants to provide a service rather than to exercise administrative control. Indi cate that if stakeholders reach agreement on an action plan, the agency would champion it in contacts with government agencies, banks, and other resource providers.28 2. Issue Framing. Choose carefully the categories employed to define the situation.29 Identify goals that are attractive to all stakeholders, given the dominant ideology of the period.30 Indicate that the problem is multifaceted, involving production, marketing, finance, and working conditions. 3. Leadership. Develop a transactive relationship with the stakeholders conducive to mutual learning.31 Explain that the action plan should be theirs, not the government's. Insist that the purpose of an action plan is to achieve change, not just to study problems. Provide a certain amount of structure for stakeholders' involvement in the planning activity. 32 Empower stakeholders to perform leadership functions.33 Modulate conflict among stakeholders so that they are stimulated to master the situation they are facing, while not overwhelmed by the task.34 Gener ate small wins and celebrate successes. 35 4. Social Learning. Create an experiential and institutional basis for joint inquiry and action. Use formal inquiry and analysis to create movement in the group process.36 Ensure mat expert knowledge is col lected or developed in response to stakeholders' perception of a need for it. 37 Give stakeholders an opportunity to accept, amend, or reject the results. Help stakeholders fashion an attractive and realistic vision of the future. Focus attention on how the local industry fits into the broader environment.38 Let specific objectives emerge in the course of ongoing inquiry and action.39 5. Negotiation. Negotiate networks of linked agreements consistent with public policy and the agency's strategy.40 Provide incentives for firms to collaborate when it is beneficial for the local industry as a whole.41 Seek firms' compliance with the action plan by making it the basis for allocating subsidies and credit. 6. Political Management. Publicize the planning process and results. Use analysis as an instrument of persuasion.42 Highlight stakeholders' commitment to achieving their vision for the local industry. Remind audiences of the relationship between public policy and the operational method of action plans. 43 The conceptual networks within which these precepts are embedded emerged in the mainstream literature about public administration as the result of decades of criticism of a vision of good government as cen tralized, hierarchical, and staffed by experts. They reflect many con temporary American beliefs about social problemsolving and governance in a decentralized liberal democracy. As elected officials and managers in Eastern Europe and Latin America look for role frames appropriate to both their positions in democratic institutions and the substantive problems of postauthoritarian situations, they may find the experientially grounded conceptual networks of public man agement attractive.
